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Retail Firm Sales and Sorting into and out of Rural and Urban Markets, 1991-2011 
Business start-ups have been responsible for roughly one-fifth of job creation in the 
United States.  Consequently, the slowdown in the rate of business entry over recent decades is a 
threat to future job growth and productivity growth in the United States.  The share of U.S. 
employment accounted for by young firms has declined by almost 30 percent over the last 
30 years and the share of firms aged five years or less has declined from 47 percent of all firms 
in the late 1980s to 39 percent of all firms before the start of the Great Recession.  The young 
firm share declined even more after the recession (Decker et al, 2014). 
It has been particularly challenging to attract new firm start-ups in rural markets.  
Agglomeration economies have greatly favored firm creation, expansion and productivity growth 
in urban markets compared to rural markets (Artz et al, 2016).  Those advantages have been tied 
to the higher concentration of potential customers and suppliers, greater ability to access an 
educated labor market, and the presence of other firms in the same market cluster that helps 
speed the creation and diffusion of new technologies.  To try to level the competitive 
environment, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has made incentivizing entrepreneurship and 
new firm expansion a key to revitalizing rural economies.  Five different programs have funded 
24,000 projects to support rural businesses and entrepreneurship since FY 2009 (USDA, 2016).1   
This study compares the factors influencing urban and rural start-ups in the retail sector. 
The retail sector is particularly useful for this purpose because retail firms are universally present 
across urban and rural markets.  In addition, relatively low start-up costs make the sector 
                                                            
1 These programs include Rural Business Development Grants, Business and Industry Loan Guarantees, Intermediary Relending 
Program Loans, Rural Microentrepreneur Assistance Program, and Rural Economic Development Loans and Grants.  Other 
programs encourage farmers to develop value added products or enhance infrastructure such as rural Broadband, community 
facilties and housing improvements.  
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particularly sensitive to variation in economic environment across areas.2 However, 
technological changes in the industry have favored retail chains exploiting information 
technologies, modern logistics, and preferential treatment by suppliers so that the share of 
U.S. retail activity accounted for by single-establishment firms fell from 70 percent in 1948 to 
39 percent in 1997 (Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda, 2005).  The increased emphasis on chain 
versus stand-alone retail stores would further disadvantage rural retail entrepreneurs. . 
The context for our analysis is the location decisions and survival rates for Iowa rural and 
urban retail start-ups from 1992 through 2011.  We first identify the local factors that increase 
rural and urban retail sales and then examine how those same factors influence the incentives to 
enter or exit an urban or rural location.  In the process, we identify the relative importance of 
general and location-specific entrepreneurial skills in thick urban and thin rural markets.   
We find that in both urban and rural markets, the same factors that increase local retail 
sales also increase incentives for firms to locate in that area.  Firms enter markets that have 
greater than average retail sales rather than markets that appear to be under-retailed.  Most of 
retail firm entry is driven by the observable factors that drive sales, but markets with sales above 
expected levels also attract more entrants, albeit by smaller percentages.  The same factors that 
are tied to increased local retail sales are also tied to increased rate of firm exits which means 
that the most successful retail sites are characterized by churning.   
The model and empirical findings are consistent with the view that general 
entrepreneurial skills are complementary with agglomeration, and so the most generally skilled 
entrepreneurs have an incentive to locate in the most agglomerated locations.  For an 
                                                            
2 Retail firms represent 28% of all establishments but only 18% of total payrolls and sales in the 2012 Economic 
Census, implying that the average retail establishment is about two-thirds of the average size of establishments in 
the United States. 
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entrepreneur to enter a thin, rural market, he or she must have unique, location-specific skillsIn 
the thicker, urban locations, there is a frequent arrival of other potential entrepreneurs who have 
some probability of having an even higher valued use for the site, and so there is both more entry 
into and exit from thick markets.  The scarcity of potential successors in thinner rural markets 
means that thin markets are characterized by low entry and low exit rates.  The larger pool of 
potential successors in thick markets implies that a greater share of the entry costs can be 
recovered at the time of exit, while in thin markets, the importance of the unique match between 
entrepreneur and location means that less of the costs can be recovered at exit. 
Literature Review 
We build on an existing empirical and theoretical literature that characterizes the relative 
economic climate for retail markets. This literature draws on central place theory, which 
proposes a hierarchical ordering of places based on the number, type and variety of retail and 
service businesses located in the place (Christaller 1933, Losch 1954). There are two key 
concepts: the range, or maximum distance consumers would be willing to travel in order to 
purchase the commodity, and the threshold level, or the minimum demand for the good or 
service that makes it economically viable for a firm to supply it (Yanagida, et al, 1991).  Goods 
with larger ranges and larger threshold levels will be located in fewer, more populated places, 
while retail stores for goods with smaller ranges and smaller threshold levels will be found in a 
greater number of lower order, less populous places.  Reilly’s (1931) gravity model provides an 
analytical method to estimate the size of a retail trade area based on the maximum distance 
customers travel to shop in a certain community.  A somewhat simpler measure of trade area size 
is the retail sales pull factor, computed as the ratio of local sales relative to the level expected on 
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the basis of local population and income.3   Ratios above 1 imply more sales than expected while 
those less than 1 suggest that local sales are leaking over to other jurisdictions.   
Pull factors have been used to measure retail trade capture in applied studies (Chase and 
Pulver 1983; Hustedde et al. 1984; Shaffer 1989; Yanagida, et al, 1991; Gruidl and Andrianacos, 
1994; Darling and Tubene, 1996) as well as by community development practitioners and 
University Extension professionals to document the relative performance of and trends in county 
and town retail.  While pull factors provide an easy-to-measure indication of the size of a local 
retail sector, they do not provide information about the determinants of local retail trade (Harris 
and Shonkwiler, 1997).  A handful of studies have examined demand and supply factors that 
affect retail pull factors (or retail sales), typically within a particular state or region (Yanagida, et 
al 1991; Gruidl and Andrianacos, 1994; Darling and Tubene, 1996; Harris and Shonkwiler, 
1997).  Beyond population and per capita income, factors that are positively related to the size of 
the retail pull factor are increasing distance from a metropolitan area or regional trade center, the 
proportion of the population over age 65, and the number of stores in the area.  Lower pull 
factors are associated with declining population, higher unemployment rates and a greater 
dependence on the agricultural sector.   
Steadily declining pull factors along with declining population are evidence of the 
erosion of retail sales away from rural markets (Gale, 1996). Population growth greatly favors 
urban retail firms because urban populations have grown by 234% since 1940 compared to 3.5% 
for rural areas.  Increased out- commuting and declining transportation costs have also 
contributed to the decline of rural retail markets (Shields and Deller, 1998; Hammond and 
                                                            
3 Shaffer (1989) provides an early summary of methods to analyze local markets.  While Reilly (1931) and Converse 
(1949) related relative retail sales to relative population, the first expression of pull factor appears to have been by 
Huff (1963, 1964) although he does not use the term.   
5 
 
Thompson, 2001).  Vias (2004) documents changes in retail employment and number of stores 
by county from 1988-1999, finding that the most distressed counties are concentrated in the 
Great Plains region.  While a large number of counties lost both stores and employment, others 
experienced growth in retail employment despite a decline in the number of stores.  There is 
evidence, however, that some rural retail markets have expanded.  Non-metropolitan counties 
with increasing populations and high levels of amenities have seen rising retail employment and 
an increasing number of stores.  Even some less densely populated, agriculturally dependent 
counties experienced growth in retail employment (Vias, 2004). 
We lack evidence on the factors that affect the pace of new retail firm entry in rural 
markets.  Much of the research on start-ups focuses on urban or metropolitan areas4. These 
studies show that new firm entry is attracted by agglomeration economies—the concentration of 
potential customers, employees, innovators, venture capitalists, and information flows that make 
firms more productive in cities than in less densely populated markets (Jofre-Monseny et al., 
2011; Ellison et al., 2010; Shapiro, 2006; Moretti, 2004; Porter, 2003; Feldman and Audretch, 
1999; Glaeser et al., 1992; Glaser and Gottlieb, 2009). However, if agglomeration economies are 
necessary for firms to enter and thrive, what still induces firms to enter thinner markets and are 
these rural firms doomed?   
Some initial investigation into these questions suggests that there may be a different 
paradigm needed to characterize an entrepreneur’s incentives to enter a rural market. First, it 
seems that rural firm start-ups are entering the relatively few rural markets that offer at least 
limited benefits of agglomeration and not the most remote markets (Artz et al., 2016). However, 
rural entrepreneurship does differ from urban entrepreneurship in important ways. First, rural 
                                                            
4 An exception is Blair, Traynor and Duan (2004) who find that manufacturing activity spurs retail development in 
more isolated rural counties, particularly in counties with greater entrepreneurial resources. 
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start-up locations are more tied to the match between the location and the entrepreneur while 
urban start-up locations are more tied to the productivity of the location itself (Artz et al., 2016). 
Second, rural start-ups face more constraints in succession of the business, a constraint that 
affects the decision to enter. Yu et al. (2011) showed that the difficulty of selling the assets of a 
rural firm means that entrepreneurs must have a higher probability that the venture will succeed 
in order to enter5. As a result, rural start-ups are more likely to succeed than observationally 
equivalent urban start-ups. Artz and Yu (2011) found differences in succession planning across 
the rural and urban markets:  rural entrepreneurs are more likely to anticipate passing the 
business on to relatives while urban entrepreneurs are more likely to anticipate selling the 
operation.  The implication is that the same factors that encourage entry in more densely 
populated markets may also encourage exit, since they affect the salvage value, and hence the 
opportunity cost, of the firm.   
Theory 
At the margin, every venture must meet or exceed the opportunity cost of capital investment, r 
which we assume is constant across time and space.  In every market j, we would expect that a 
viable venture by entrepreneur i would satisfy  
(1)  ݎ ൑ గ೔ೕ೟௉ೕ೟   
where ߨ௜௝௧ is the expected present value of the stream of net earnings from the ith venture in the 
jth location and ௝ܲ௧ is the cost of opening the venture in location j.   
                                                            
5 An implication is that rural firms face an asset fixity (Johnson, 1956; Edwards, 1959) or spatial fixity problem 
(Ward and Hite, 1999; Hite, 1997). The asset fixity trap arises when the salvage value of the farm deviates 
significantly from its use value under the current owner and the asset becomes “trapped” in its current usage. This 
has implications for entry. Since the salvage value will be lower in less densely populated markets, asset fixity will 
be more severe in rural than urban areas. This is consistent with the empirical evidence that rural firms live as long, 
or longer, than urban firms (Buss and Lin, 1990; Huiban, 2011; Yu, Orazem, and Jolly, 2011). 
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We assume that the stream of net earnings from the venture will depend on the 
productive attributes of its location and the skills of the entrepreneur according to6  
(2)   ߨ௜௝௧ ൌ ௝ܼ௧ఈೋሺ1 ൅	ߝ௜ ൅	ߝ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߟ௜௝௧ሻ  
Net returns from locating the venture in j depend on the productive amenities at that location, 
௝ܼ௧,  which would include measures of agglomeration economies and other locational 
advantages.  If these amenities are indeed productive, then ߙ௓ ൐ 0. The other factors affecting 
the value of the venture at location j include the talents of the entrepreneur that are transferable 
to any location, ߝ௜; the complementarities between the entrepreneur’s skills and location j, ߝ௜௝; 
the location-specific fixed effect, ߝ௝; and an i.i.d. zero mean shock to profitability,	ߟ௜௝௧.   The 
specification presumes that there are some entrepreneurial skills that are location-specific such as 
knowledge of the customer base, relationships with suppliers or potential financiers, or 
knowledge of the natural or human resources that would enhance the business.  We assume that 
ߝ௜௝, ߝ௜, and ߝ௝ are identically and independently distributed with zero mean. 
The cost of entry, ௝ܲ௧, will reflect the cost of the land and construction.  The land price 
will reflect the location-specific attributes, ௝ܼ௧.  The construction and other entry costs, ܥ௧, are 
assumed to be the same across locations.   
(3)   ௝ܲ௧ ൌ ሺ ௝ܼ௧ఉೋܥ௧ሻଵିఊೕ  
where 0 ൏ ߛ௝ ൏ 	1 is the location-specific share of the entry costs that can be recaptured were the 
operation to be sold.   
                                                            
6 Multiplying by ሺ1 ൅	ߝ௜ ൅	ߝ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߟ௜௝௧ሻ allows individual and locational unobservable attributes to have a zero 
mean effect across all potential entrepreneurs on present value in the location, but still allow some entrepreneurs to 
have above average expected revenue due to their skills and their locational match.    
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Combining (1-3)7 and taking logs, we have that the log of the present value of entrepreneur i 
entering market j in year t is  
(4)   ௜ܸ௝௧ ൌ ቀߙ௓ െ ߚ௓൫1 െ ߛ௝൯ቁ ln൫ ௝ܼ௧൯ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߝ௜ ൅	ߝ௝ ൅ ߟ௜௝௧ െ ൫1 െ ߛ௝൯ln	ሺܥ௧ሻ	  
The entrepreneur will select market j if  
(5)  ௜ܸ௝௧ ൐ ௜ܸ௝ᇲ௧	∀݆′ ് ݆  
The model generates several useful insights about new retail entrants. 
1)  Local attributes will not affect entry if ߙ௓ ൌ ߚ௓൫1 െ ߛ௝൯, meaning that the local attributes 
have the same effect on the stream of returns from the venture as they have on the purchase price 
of the land net of expected lost value from resale.  If ventures are risky, we would expect that 
ߙ௓ ൐ ߚ௓൫1 െ ߛ௝൯ so that entrepreneurs are rewarded for taking on risk beyond the net purchase 
price of the land. 
2)  The talents of the entrepreneur are not incorporated in the purchase price of the land or the 
salvage value of the firm because the entrepreneur would not stay with the firm were it to be 
sold. 
3) Areas with high local productive amenities make entrepreneurs more productive, and so there 
is an incentive for the most talented entrepreneurs to enter the most productive markets.  To see 
why, note that the reward from individual entrepreneurial skills reflects the level of local 
productive attributes,  
(6A)   డగ೔ೕ೟డఌ೔ ൌ ௝ܼ௧
ఈೋ	 ;  
                                                            
7 We use the approximation that ln	ሺ1 ൅ ݔሻ ൎ ݔ when x is small. 
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and so the reward from entrepreneurial ability is greatest in the most attribute rich locales: 
(6B)  డ
మగ೔ೕ೟
డఌ೔డ௓ೕ೟ ൌ ߙ௓ ௝ܼ௧
ఈೋିଵ ൐ 0  
4) There is an incentive for entrepreneurs with location-specific skills to enter those locations, 
consistent with data that suggests the existence of a local-bias in entrepreneurial entry 
(Michelacci and Silva, 2007; Dahl and Sorenson, 2012). 
These predictions imply that the very best retailers will locate in the densest markets.  
The value of the operation will depend on the talents of the entrepreneur.  However, the owner’s 
skills do not continue with the firm or location when it passes on to a successor.  Consequently, 
the resale value of the venture will not depend on the attributes of the current owner but on the 
skills of the successor.  If the purchase price of the location can be fully recouped on resale, the 
attributes do not affect the entry decision.  However, if the resale price is less than the purchase 
price, both the locational attributes and the share of the cost that can be recouped will affect the 
decision to enter a given location. 
Empirical Strategy 
The previous discussion suggests that profitable locational attributes ௝ܼ௧ will attract retail 
entry if the value of ௝ܼ௧ are not fully captured upon resale of the property.  That suggests two 
empirical tests, the first being to identify the elements of ௝ܼ௧ and the second being to assess if the 
elements of ௝ܼ௧ matter for entry consistent with their effects on profit. 
Our first task is accomplished by evaluating equation (2) at the market j level to get    
(7)  ln	ሺߨ௝௧ሻ ൌ ߙ௓ln	ሺ ௝ܼ௧ሻ ൅	ߟ௝௧  
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where ߨ௝௧ is a measure of aggregate value across firms in area j at time t, and ߟ௝௧ is the aggregate 
error term across individuals.  We assume that ߟ௝௧ ൌ 	ߟ௝ ൅ ߦ௝௧,  a location-specific fixed effect 
plus a random term.  Because of the i.i.d. assumption, the expected value of the individual 
specific effects would be zero in the population, but the nonrandom sorting across markets due to 
the possible complementarity between locational attributes and individuals’ skills may lead to 
greater productivity in denser markets. Our measure of ߨ௝௧ is based on aggregate  revenue from 
retail sales in the area at time t, ௝ܴ௧.  If the current revenue stream is a reasonable predictor of the 
expected future stream of revenues, then ߨ௝௧ ൎ ோೕ೟௠ೕࣻ೟ି௚ೕ where ௝݉ is the location-specific price cost 
margin,8 ࣻ is the interest rate and ݃௝௧ is the location specific growth rate in retail sales.  In logs,  
ln൫ߨ௝௧൯ ൌ ln൫ ௝ܴ௧൯ ൅ ln	ሺ ௠ೕࣻି௚ೕ೟ሻሻ.  The second term becomes another source of a location-specific 
fixed effect.  As a result, the estimable form of (7) becomes  
(8)  ln൫ ௝ܴ௧൯ ൌ ߙ௓ ln൫ ௝ܼ௧൯ ൅	ߟ௝ ൅ ln	ሺ ௠ೕࣻି௚ೕ೟ሻ ൅ ߦ௝௧  
Elements of ௝ܼ௧ with positive attached coefficients ߙ௓ will be systematically correlated with 
better expected revenue streams.  The error term, ߦ௝௧, provides a measure of whether the market 
has atypically strong retail sales, or is underserved relative to sales that would be expected based 
on productive amenities.  The error term will vary about 0, and so the measure that corresponds 
to the traditional pull factor will be ܲܨ௝௧ ൌ exp	ሺߦ௝௧ሻ which will be greater than 1 if sales are 
unexpectedly large and less than 1 otherwise.  
                                                            
8 The price cost margin for area j in any period t is defined as ௝݉ ൌ ௉ೕି஼ೕ௉ೕ  so that ௝ܴ ∙ ൫ ௝݉൯ ൌ ௝ܲܳ௝ ∙ ሺ
൫௉ೕି஼ೕ൯
௉ೕ ሻ ൌ
ܳ௝൫ ௝ܲ െ ܥ௝൯ which is net revenue. 
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 Our second task is to assess whether the factors that positively affect the retail revenue 
stream also affect the incentives for new entrepreneurs to enter the market.  To test that, we 
apply equations 4) and 5) to assess the probability that equation 5) holds, i.e. 
(9)   ܲݎሺ ௜ܸ௝௧ ൐ ௜ܸ௝ᇲ௧ሻ ൌ  
ܲݎ ቂቀߙ௓ െ ߚ௓൫1 െ ߛ௝൯ቁ ln൫ ௝ܼ௧൯ െ ቀߙ௓ െ ߚ௓൫1 െ ߛ௝ᇲ൯ቁ ln൫ ௝ܼᇲ௧൯ ൅ ൫ߛ௝ᇲ െ ߛ௝൯ lnሺܥ௧ሻቃ  
൏ ߝ௜௝ െ ߝ௜௝ᇱ ൅ ߟ௜௝௧ െ ߟ௜௝ᇱ௧ 
 which can be estimated using conditional logit methods.  The theory predicts that if not all of the 
location-specific productive attributes are factored into the resale value of the venture at exit, the 
same factors that raise the retail revenue stream should increase the pace of new retail firm entry. 
We can characterize that decision using a dichotomous variable ܧ௜௝௧ ൌ 1 if a retail firm opts to 
enter area j in year t and ܧ௜௝௧ ൌ 0 otherwise.  That implies that ܧ௜௝௧ ൌ 1	if ሺ ௜ܸ௝௧ ൐ ௜ܸ௝ᇲ௧ሻ.  If we 
assume that the composite error term ߝ௜௝ െ ߝ௜௝ᇱ ൅ ߟ௜௝௧ െ ߟ௜௝ᇱ௧ follows the type-1 extreme 
distribution, we can estimate (9) using the conditional logit estimator.   
Data 
        The dependent variables for this stage of the analysis include aggregate retail sales by 
county and new retail start-ups in the county in each year.  Our measure of retail sales is the 
taxable retail sales in each county in each year.  The Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance 
has compiled sales tax data for every county and year since 1976.  Because sales tax rates are 
known for every jurisdiction, we can derive the aggregate taxable retail sales for each 
county.  To match our data on new firm entry, we restrict our analysis to the period from 1992 
on.  
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 Data on new retail firm start-ups were compiled from the Iowa edition of the National 
Establishment Time Series (NETS) data set that includes the universe of all firm start-ups in the 
state.  Data were available on start-ups from 1992 through 2011.   
 Traditional pull factor analysis support including local population and income per capita 
in our vector of locational attributes, ௝ܼ௧.  However, the relevant local population of shoppers 
would also include in-commuters.  Out-commuting increased fastest in the towns under 2,500 
population, reaching 73% by 2009.  We measure the net rate of in-commuters (in-commuters 
minus out-commuters as a fraction of the local population) by the ratio of local employees by 
place of work divided by the local population.  We culled all information on population, per 
capita income, and local employment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis CA1 county 
dataset. 
Availability of high-speed internet may also affect local retail sales.  Internet access is 
commonly believed to reduce local retail sales because of the easy substitutability of alternative 
suppliers, but it can also make remote customers accessible to local retailers.  The National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration Survey of High Speed Internet Providers 
has reported HSIProviders: the number of High Speed Internet providers by Zip Code since 
December 1999.  This information was aggregated to the county level using population weights 
by Zip Code. The measure will show if there is any Broadband provision and, if present, the 
level of competition among providers that should be inversely related to the cost of service.  
Before 1999, Broadband service was not widely available in any county in Iowa.   
The third set of measures that could affect the local market for retail includes measures of 
agglomeration economies.  We make use of measures explored by Artz, Kim, and Orazem 
(2016) for their ability to explain relative firm incentives to enter rural and urban markets.    
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Cluster represents the number of firms in a county in the same industry.  Having multiple firms 
in an industry in one place is believed to help in accessing commonly trained workers or 
common innovations.  In retail, it is likely most important for lowering the cost of search by 
customers seeking alternative products in diversified retail markets.  Our cluster measure at the 
county level represents the average value of the measure across all 4 digit retail sectors.  For 
individual firm entry, it is the 4-digit cluster measure for firm’s retail sector.  
The next measure is Herfindahl, a measure of the economic diversity of commodity 
offerings in a county.  Counties with highly concentrated economies are more vulnerable to 
booms and busts because large amounts of people in the area are employed in very few 
industries. This vulnerability can lead to more cyclically fluctuating demand for retail sales 
within the county.  Moreover, a more diversified industrial base means that customers do not 
have to travel long distances to find the range of consumer products they seek.  For both reasons, 
we would expect that a highly diverse economy will have more stable retail sales relative to a 
concentrated economy.  We measure our Herfindahl index by the summed square of the 
employment shares across all sectors in the economy, using the data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  
Upstream is an indicator of how close a firm is to their upstream providers.  Being 
proximate to suppliers decreases transportation costs and inventory maintenance costs, leading to 
more competitive pricing by the firm.  Downstream firm customers are not germane to this study 
because we are primarily looking at retail firms who sell to end customers and not to other firms. 
Our measure of upstream providers follows that of Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr (2010).  We use an 
input-output model to measure the share of suppliers to the local retail sector that are present in 
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the same county.   For our more detailed firm entry analysis, we can disaggregate this measure to 
the 4-digit retail level.9  
We also control for remaining variation in the climate for local retail with a series of 
dummy variables designating each county to 1 of 9 possible Rural-Urban continuum codes 
(Beale codes) that define each county by population size and proximity to a metro area.  Details 
on the definitions along with sample statistics are presented in Table 1. 
The error term, ߦ௝௧, from the retail sales equation will be the unexpected sales that are 
orthogonal to the vector of observable market factors,	 ௝ܼ௧.  We use this as a measure of the 
natural log of the Pull Factor. 
Results  
We establish the factors that affect the natural log of county taxable retail sales using 
equation (8).  We use the elements of the vector ln൫ ௝ܼ௧൯ as defined in the previous section.  Our 
control for the area-specific factors ln	ሺ ௠ೕࣻି௚ೕ೟ሻ is defined by the vector of 9 possible Beale code 
dummy variables plus a time trend. Our estimation controls for clustering at the county level.10  
The results are presented in the first column of Table 2.  
 The two factors commonly used to model the local retail “pull” are population and per 
capita income.  Both have positive effects on retail sales, but population is the more important of 
the two.  A 1% increase in population raises taxable retail sales by 1.2%.  In contrast, a 1% 
increase in per capita income only increases taxable sales by 0.1% and the effect is not 
                                                            
9 At the national level, the most important sectors providing intermediate inputs into the retail trade sector are 
construction, manufacturing, real estate, arts and entertainment, transportation, and nongovernmental services.  
Inputs from manufacturing are unlikely to be provided within the same county, but the other inputs are plausibly 
available locally.  We thank Younjun Kim for supplying this matrix. 
10 We also estimated equation (8) with county-specific fixed effects.  Results were similar to those reported in Table 
2 except that the cluster effect became virtually zero and statistically insignificant.  
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significantly different from zero.  Much more important is the employment rate by place of 
work.  A 1% increase in the ratio of workers in the county relative to the county population 
raises taxable sales by 1.2%, presumably because the population stays in the county to work 
rather than working in a neighboring market. 
  Local availability of high speed Internet does not affect local retail sales positively or 
negatively.  Local access to suppliers is also unrelated to the level of retail sales.  However, 
having larger concentrations of retailers in the same 4-digit retail sector does increase overall 
sales, as does having a more diverse local economy.  In all counties, taxable retail sales face a 
steady headwind.  Retail sales are declining at a rate of 1.5% per year, other factors constant. 
 We can illustrate the roles of local population and the local employment rate on retail 
sales by fixing each at their start of period values and simulating what retail sales would have 
been had population or employment rates not changed.  We are particularly interested in 
examining how these factors affect relative sales growth in thick (urban) or thin (rural) markets.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the time path of population growth and employment rate growth in 
three Beale code groups, 2: metro with over 250 thousand to 1 million population; 5: urban with 
over 20,000 in population but not adjacent to a metro area; and 9: completely rural with less than 
2,500 population and not adjacent to a metro.   
 Since 1976, population rose 21% in metro areas, fell 17% in urban, nonadjacent areas, 
and fell 26% in the most rural areas.  With an elasticity of 1.2, population loss alone would 
explain a 55% gap in retail sales growth between metro and remote rural markets.  However, 
employment rates were rising about 20% over time in all markets because of rising female labor 
force participation rates and the changing age distribution in the population due to the baby 
boom.  Rising employment rates would have increased retail sales by 24% in the remote rural 
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markets, not quite counteracting the negative effect of the population decline.  In Figure 3 we 
show the net result.  Had population in rural markets (Beale codes 6-9) remained constant at the 
level in 1991, rural retail sales would have declined only 3% between 1991 and 2013 instead of 
the 11% decline actually experienced.  Had the rural employment rate stayed constant at the 
1991 level, rural retail sales would have decreased 29%, a much larger decline than actually 
experienced.  Rural retailers were greatly helped by rising local employment rates, although the 
employment rates rose even faster in the urban and metro markets. 
The second column of Table 2 estimates equation (9) using a conditional logit specification.  
Each firm chooses a county to enter from the 99 options available, conditional on having decided 
to enter a county in Iowa in the given year.  The estimation holds all firm-specific and 
entrepreneur-specific attributes ߝ௜ constant as well as fixed effects for the county Beale codes. 
Our primary interest is in the extent to which firm entry follows the factors that also increase 
county retail sales. While the data sets, dependent variables, and econometric specification are all 
different across columns 1 and 2, the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the same factor 
have the same sign holds in 7 of 8 possible coefficient pairs.  The only exception is for local 
upstream supply which has a significant positive effect on firm entry but an insignificant effect 
on retail sales.  The probability that we would randomly match 7 of 8 possible pairs is only 
3.1%.11 
The coefficient magnitudes in the two columns are not comparable, and so we present the 
elasticities in Table 3.  Firm entry is more sensitive to variation in factors that affect retail sales 
                                                            
11 Using the binomial distribution, the probability of k outcomes of n  possible trials in a trial with two equally 
probable outcomes is defined by ࣪ሺ݊, ݇ሻ ൌ ሺ ሻ	݌௞ሺ1 െ ݌ሻ௡ି௞௞௡ ൌ 	 ௡!௞!ሺ௡ି௞ሻ! .  In our case, p = 0.5, n is 8 and k is 7, so 
࣪ሺ8, 7ሻ ൌ 0.03125.   
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than are retail sales themselves.  This is not surprising as these firms have the option of 
comparing relative economic environments across 99 possible locations at the time of initial 
investment.  However, incumbent firms are already committed to the current location and cannot 
move in response to changing market conditions.  Consequently, retail sales that are derived 
mainly from incumbent firms are less sensitive to the latest market factors than are current 
investment decisions by the next cohort of retail firms.   
If expected retail sales encourage entry, do unexplained retail sales also encourage entry?  Or 
do markets that generate more retail sales than expected based on the factors included in Table 2 
discourage entry?  To test this, we re-estimated equation (9) including our measure of the natural 
log of the Pull Factor, the error term from equation (8), ߦ௝௧,  as an added regressor.  The 
coefficient on ߦ௝௧ is 0.39 with a z-statistic of 12.3, and so there is clear evidence that retail firms 
enter markets with unexpectedly large retail sales.  The implied effect is modest, however.  A 
shock to retail sales equal to one standard deviation in ߦ௝௧	increases the probability of firm entry 
in that market by only 6%.  Consequently, local firm entry is driven by the observable factors 
that encourage retail sales and not unexpectedly large sales. 
Location-specific human capital will be more important in thin than in thick markets 
Suppose that market ࣬	is a thin, rural market with low values of ܼ࣬௧ compared to a thick, urban 
market ࣯ with ܼ࣯௧.  On the margin, ventures in ࣯ and ࣬ have to return r, and so  
൫ߙ௓ െ ߚ௓ሺ1 െ ߛ࣯ሻ൯ lnሺܼ࣯௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜࣯ ൅	ߝ௜|ሺ݆ ൌ ࣯ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߛ࣯ሻ lnሺܥ௧ሻ 	൅ ߟ௜࣯௧  
   ൌ ൫ߙ௓ െ ߚ௓ሺ1 െ ߛ࣬ሻ൯ lnሺܼ࣬௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜࣬ ൅ ߝ௜|ሺ݆ ൌ ࣬ሻ െ ሺ1 െ ߛ௞ሻln	ሺܥ௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௜࣬௧	  
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where the notation |ሺ݆ ൌ ࣯ሻ reflects the application of the individual entrepreneurial skill to 
market ࣯.  The thin market will have less agglomeration and other productive amenities, and so 
lnሺܼ࣯௧ሻ	> lnሺܼ࣬௧ሻ and ߝ࣯ ൐ ߝ࣬.  The thin market will also have a disadvantage in the resale 
market if the assets of the firm are to be sold, and so ߛ࣯ ൐ ߛ࣬.  As a result, we would expect that 
൫ߙ௓ െ ߚ௓ሺ1 െ ߛ࣯ሻ൯ lnሺܼ࣯௧ሻ ൅ ߝ࣯ ൐ ൫ߙ௓ െ ߚ௓ሺ1 െ ߛ࣬ሻ൯ lnሺܼ࣬௧ሻ ൅ ߝ࣬ and ሺ1 െ ߛ࣯ሻ lnሺܥ௧ሻ ൏
ሺ1 െ ߛ࣬ሻ lnሺܥ௧ሻ.			 Both of these favor entry into the thick market because the resale value of the 
land and the building will be a greater share of the original value in the thick market.  As a 
consequence, the individual entrepreneur’s skill must be sufficiently large in the thin market to 
make up for the locational disadvantage, and so  
(10)     ߝ௜࣯ ൅ ߝ௜|ሺ݆ ൌ ࣯ሻ ൏ ߝ௜࣬ ൅ ߝ௜|ሺ݆ ൌ ࣬ሻ  
As noted, equation (6B) suggests that high ߝ௜ individuals will have an added incentive to locate 
in the thick market, and so ߝ௜|ሺ݆ ൌ ࣯ሻ ൒ ߝ௜|ሺ݆ ൌ ࣬ሻ.  As a result, location-specific skills must be 
most important for firm entry in thin markets, and so ߝ௜࣯ ൏ ߝ௜࣬. 
Exit 
Exit will occur when the opportunity cost of the site exceeds the returns.12  Let ߤ௜௝ ൌ
ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߝ௝ ൅ ߝ௜	be the combined unobserved location-specific and idiosyncratic skills of the ith 
entrepreneur.  The cumulative distribution function of ߤ௜௝ is ܨሺߤ௜௝ሻ.  It would be efficient to 
transfer the location to another enterprise if the productivity of the location could be increased.  
Using (5), it is efficient to transfer the location from entrepreneur i to entrepreneur ℓ when 
௜ܸ௝௧ ൏ ℓܸ௝௧ െ ܿ௧,  where ܿ௧ is the cost of altering the property for the new venture.   We assume 
                                                            
12 We could make firm turnover also a function of evolving information on the entrepreneur’s skills rather than 
making these skills known at the time of entry, but the more interesting source of turnover is the changing 
opportunity cost of the location due to the arrival of more able entrepreneurs. 
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those costs are common across areas.  Applying (4), the efficient exit condition implies that  
ߤℓ௝ ൐ ߤ௜௝ ൅	ܿ௧ so that the superior skills of the new entrepreneur ℓ compared to entrepreneur i 
raises the revenue stream sufficiently to pay for entrepreneur i’s value added to the venture plus 
the transition cost to the new venture.  The probability that a given entrepreneur ℓ will take over 
from entrepreneur i is ܨሺߤ௜௝ ൅	ܿ௧ሻ which decreases in the skills of the current entrepreneur. 
 As shown in equation (10), the marginal entrepreneurs in thin, rural markets will have 
low values of ௝ܼ௧ and high values of ߤ௜௝ while the marginal entrepreneurs in thick, urban markets 
will have high values of ௝ܼ௧	and low values of ߤ௜௝.  That means that there will be a higher 
probability that a firm exits business in thick compared to thin markets, a result consistent with 
the finding of Yu et al (2011) that rural firms live longer than observationally equivalent urban 
firms.   
This observation translates to a market-level prediction that the conditions that lead to 
more firm entry in thick markets will also lead to more firm exits in thick markets.  Let ௝ܰ be the 
number of potential entrepreneurs in market j.  Thick markets (࣯) have large numbers of 
potential entrepreneurs and thin markets (࣬) have small numbers, and so ࣯ܰ ൐ ࣬ܰ.  The 
probability ܩ൫ߤ௜௝ ൅	ܿ௧, ௝ܰ൯ that one of these potential entrepreneurs will enter the market in 
place of the ith entrepreneur is   
(11)  ܩ൫ߤ௜௝ ൅	ܿ௧, ௝ܰ൯ ൌ 1 െ ሾ1 െ ܨ൫ߤ௜௝ ൅	ܿ௧൯ሿேೕ.  
The associated density function is g൫ߤ௜௝ ൅	ܿ௧, ௝ܰ൯.		 
Suppose the kth entrepreneur in each market is the weakest venture.  Because ߤ௞࣯ ൏ ߤ௞࣬ , 
meaning that the kth entrepreneur in the thick market will have a poorer draw on the idiosyncratic 
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productivity component than the kth entrepreneur in the thin market, and because ࣯ܰ ൐ ࣬ܰ, it 
must be true that ܩሺߤ௞࣯ ൅	ܿ௧, ࣯ܰሻ ൐ ܩሺߤ௞࣬ ൅	ܿ௧, ࣬ܰሻ as illustrated in Figure 4. Consequently, 
there will be more new entrepreneurs taking over from old entrepreneurs in the thick markets 
than the thin markets.  That means that the same factors that lead to better conditions for firm 
entry in thick markets (high ܼ࣯௧) at time t will be correlated with a higher probability that the 
firm will subsequently exit due to the higher probability that a more skilled entrepreneur will 
take over.  
 To test this proposition, we examine the role of ௝ܼ௧ on firm exits.  We embed our measure 
of these unobserved factors in the firm’s survival function.  Let the realized return from the 
entrepreneurial venture be defined as: 
ߨ௜௝,௧ାఛோ ൌ ௝ܼ଴ఈೋ൫1 ൅	ߝ௜ ൅	ߝ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߟ௜௝଴൯ߠ௜௝,௧ାఛ		    
where the first term on the right-hand-side represents the profit expected at the time of start-up;  
ߠ௜௝,௧ାఛ denotes a random negative or positive shock to the expected stream of returns to the ith 
venture that is realized as of time ݐ ൅ ߬.  The ith entrepreneur will exit if ௝ܼ଴ఈೋ൫1 ൅	ߝ௜ ൅	ߝ௝ ൅
ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߟ௜௝଴൯ߠ௜௝,௧ାఛ ൏ 	ߤℓ௝ െ	ܿ௧ାఛ so that venture i’s realized value is exceeded by another 
potential venture ℓ in the same location.  
Let ௜ܶ ൐ 0 denote the duration of firm i’s existence.  If entrepreneur i exits business ߬௜ 
years after start-up, then ௜ܶ ൌ ߬௜.  Ti has a cumulative distribution, ܪሺ߬௜) which is the probability 
of firm exit due to poor economic performance or the appearance of a dominant local rival 
venture.  The associated probability density function is ݄ሺ߬௜).  
The probability of failure at time ݐ ൅ ߬ is: 
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(12)    ܪሺ߬௜ሻ ൌ Pr	ሺ ௜ܶ ൑ ߬௜ሻ  
           = Pr	ሺln	ሺܼ௝௧ᇱ ሻ߱௓ ൅ ߝ௜ ൅	ߝ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߟ௜௝଴ ൅ ln ߠ௜௝௞,௧ାఛ െ ߤℓ௝ ൅ ܿ௧ାఛ ൑ 0ሻ 
           = Pr	ሺߝ௜ ൅	ߝ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝ ൅ ߟ௜௝଴ ൅ ln ߠ௜௝௞,௧ାఛ െ ߤℓ௝ ൑ െ൫ln	ሺܼ௝௧ᇱ ሻ߱௓൯ െ ܿ௧ାఛሻ 
            ൌ ܪሾെ൫ln	ሺܼ௝௧ᇱ ሻ߱௓൯ െ ܿ௧ାఛሻ]       
We can control for the cost of entry ܿ௧ାఛ with year-specific dummy variables.  Our theory 
suggests that the same factors that lead to added local entry will lead to more local exits, and so 
we expect that ݏ݃݊ሺ߱௓ሻ ൌ ݏ݃݊ ቀߙ௓ െ ߚ௓൫1 െ ߛ௝൯ቁ.   
 Equation (12) defines a survival function analysis.  We assume the composite error term 
in (12) has a log-logistic distribution which implies that we can use log logistic survival analysis 
to estimate the vector of parameters, ߱௓. 
Results of the survival analysis 
 The results of the estimation of equation (12) are presented in the third column of Table 
2.  We expected that the factors encouraging firm entry would also increase the likelihood that 
the firm would exit because of the higher density of potential dominating ventures in thick 
markets.  The prediction holds up reasonably well, with sign reversals between columns 2 and 3 
occurring in 6 of 8 possible cases.  One contrary result is that the employment rate has a large 
positive and significant effect on firm entry but has a small, insignificant but still positive effect 
on firm survival.  The other is that more industry concentration, indicated by higher values of the 
Herfindahl index, suggest a small and insignificant negative effect on both firm entry and firm 
survival.  The random probability that the 8 comparisons would result in 6 sign reversals is 
10.9%.  If we focus only on coefficients that are statistically significant in both the entry and 
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survival equations, the hypothesis holds up in all 4 cases, a result that would occur at random 
6.3% of the time.  When the unexpected retail sales measure, ߦ௝௧, is added as an additional factor, 
its coefficient is 0.05 with a z statistic of 1.78.   In general, we find that either we get the 
expected sign reversal or the effects become very small in the survival equation compared to the 
entry equation.  We view this as at least modest support for the presumption that there is both 
more firm entry and more firm exit in thicker markets. 
Conclusions 
This study identifies distinctions in entrepreneurial decision-making between thin rural markets 
and thick urban markets.  The study focuses on retail sales because of the sector’s low cost of 
entry and exit.  Among the findings: 
1)  The most able entrepreneurs will enter urban markets because of agglomeration factors that 
complement their skills.  However, the entrepreneurs that enter rural markets will have atypically 
large location-specific skills.   
2)  The same factors that affect retail sales also affect new retail firm entry.  In addition, areas 
that have strong pull factors so that ߦ௝௧ ൐ 0  also attract new retail entrants.  These findings 
suggest that firms enter markets that have better than expected retail sales rather than markets 
that appear to be under-retailed.  One reason is that entry into the most successful markets 
promise a higher salvage value of the initial cost of entry if the venture fails. 
3)  If firms do not enter underserved markets because the expected profitability is greater in 
markets already enjoying atypically large sales, then efforts to incentivize entry into the 
underserved markets are likely to be unsuccessful.  The entrepreneurs who enter a thin market 
solely because of the subsidy will lack the location-specific match capital necessary to sustain 
the venture, and so they will exit if the subsidy expires.   
23 
 
4)  The same factors that are tied to increased local retail sales are tied to increased rate of firm 
exits.  That suggests that the most successful retail sites are subject to churning.  Areas with 
more rapid arrival rates of potential entrepreneurs (the thick urban markets) are able to pass sites 
from one entrepreneur to another, even if the first entrepreneur has a successful venture.  The 
higher exit rate is driven by higher opportunity costs of the site – the successor anticipates an 
even more successful venture and is willing to pay beyond the value of the venture to the first 
entrepreneur.  Thin markets will have lower exit rates because they lack the pool of potential 
successors. 
5)  Rural retailers faced declining demand as a result of population loss.  Offsetting this partially 
was the rising employment rate of rural residents reflecting the movement of the baby-boom into 
prime earning years and the rising female labor force participation rates in the 1990s.    Had that 
not happened, the decline in rural retail would have been much more severe.  As the baby boom 
retires and as commuting to urban markets becomes increasingly common, rural employment 
rates may fall, compounding the effect of declining population on rural retail sales.  In contrast to 
the ease of transition from one urban venture to another, the low exit rate from rural markets is 
related to the high location-specific skills of rural entrepreneurs.  These location-specific skills 
are lost when the location passes on to a successor, and so there is a greater loss of value when 
rural properties change hands.  
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Table 1: Summary of Variables 
 Variables and definitions Mean Std. Dev. 
ln(pop): log of county population 9.851 0.788 
ln(pc_inc): log of county per capita income 4.924 0.200 
ln(emp_rate): log of county employment by place of work 
divided by the county residential population 3.964 0.186 
HSIProviders: total number of providers per county 1.517 2.794 
Cluster: number of firms in the same industry 0.859  0.196  
Herfindahl:sum of employment shares^2 0.233 0.070 
Upstream: firms producing for the local retail sector 0.301 0.493 
Year 2.06 0.66 
Beale codes: 3: Metro area with population <250,000; 4: Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to 
metro area; 5: : Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to metro area; 6: Urban population of 2,500 
to 19,999, adjacent to metro area; 7 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to metro area; 8: 
Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to metro area; 9: Completely rural or less than 
2,500 urban population, not adjacent to metro area  
 
   
29 
 
Table 2: Coefficients and Standard Errors 
Variable lnRetail Salesa 
(1) 
Firm Entryb
(2) 
Survival 
(3) 
 Coefficient 
(t) 
Std Err. Coefficient 
(z) 
Std Err. Coefficient 
(z) 
Std Err. 
ln(pop) 1.181** 
(33.62) 
0.035 0.936** 
(72.95) 
0.013 -0.013 
(1.11) 
0.012 
ln(pc_inc) 0.093 
(0.62) 
0.151 0.206** 
(3.22) 
0.064 -0.747** 
(13.25) 
0.056 
ln(emp_rate) 1.246** 
(9.37) 
0.133 0.505** 
(11.00) 
0.046 0.055 
(1.36) 
0.041 
HSIP 0.004 
(0.97) 
0.004 0.011** 
(3.60) 
0.003 -0.082** 
(29.37) 
0.002 
Cluster 0.174* 
(1.97) 
0.088 0.342** 
(10.09) 
0.034 -0.269** 
(8.72) 
0.031 
Herfindahl -1.080** 
(4.00) 
0.270 -0.146 
(1.58) 
0.092 -0.110 
(1.32) 
0.083 
Upstream -0.035 
(1.05) 
0.033 0.034** 
(4.30) 
0.008 -0.001 
(0.09) 
0.007 
Year -0.015** 
(4.68) 
0.003 -0.023** 
(12.06) 
0.002 0.065** 
(35.47) 
0.002 
R2 0.978 0.773  
N 1,979 1,978 160,170 
*=statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  **=statistically significant at the 0.1 level 
Regressions included dummy variables for Beale Codes 
aStandard errors corrected for clustering at the county level. 
b We use the Guimaraes et al (2003) Poisson regression equivalent form of the conditional logit estimator. 
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Table 3: Elasticities 
Variable lnRetail Sales Firm Entry Survival 
 
ey/ex 
(t) Std Err. 
ey/ex 
(z) Std Err. 
ey/ex 
(z) Std Err. 
ln(pop) 1.181** 
(33.62) 0.035 
9.198** 
(72.95) 0.126 
-0.618** 
(4.91) 0.126 
ln(pc_inc) 0.093 
(0.62) 0.151 
1.025** 
(3.22) 0.318 
1.004** 
(3.90) 0.257 
ln(emp_rate) 1.246** 
(9.37) 0.133 
2.048** 
(11.00) 0.186 
-0.174 
(1.04) 0.167 
HSIP 0.004 
(0.97) 0.004 
0.025** 
(3.60) 0.007 
-0.006 
(0.84) 0.007 
Cluster 0.174* 
(1.97) 0.088 
0.293** 
(10.09) 0.029 
-0.395** 
(13.37) 0.228 
Herfindahl -1.080** 
(4.00) 0.270 
-0.034 
(1.58) 0.022 
-0.063** 
(3.62) 0.172 
Upstream -0.035 
(1.05) 0.033 
0.010** 
(4.30) 0.002 
-0.024** 
(3.04) 0.008 
Year -0.015** 
(4.68) 0.003     
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Figure 1: Population growth for Iowa metro, urban nonadjacent and rural nonadjacent counties, 
1976 - 2014 
 
Figure 2: Growth in the ratio of employment by place of work to population in the county for 
Iowa metro, urban nonadjacent and rural nonadjacent counties, 1976 - 2014 
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Figure 3: Simulated time path of Iowa rural retail sales had population or employment rate 
remained at their 1991 levels compared to the actual time path of rural retail sales  
 
 
Figure 4: Expected distribution of idiosyncratic firm value in thick and thin markets 
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